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I. INTRODUCTION
In an effort to provide swift justice while respecting due process, the courts
have refined a tool that in theory serves this purpose superbly: summary
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judgment.1 Unfortunately, swift justice and due process often create conflicting
interests. 2 As a result, the tool that appears effective in theory presents
significant difficulties when judges must apply it in practice.
In Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 it is stated that summary judgment
"shall be rendered forthwith if... there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and.., the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."3
Obstacles that judges confront when determining whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists, are the subject of this Note. Stated simply, a material fact is
one which will affect the outcome of the case, and a material fact raises a
genuine issue if a reasonable jury could reach different conclusions concerning
that fact.4
During its 1986 term, the Supreme Court announced the Celotex trilogy of
decisions,5 articulating precise standards for determining the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Nevertheless, judges have found the easily
understood standard difficult to apply.6 Indeed, courts often struggle with
applicable substantive doctrines in order to rationalize just results.
1Some would even argue that the changes made by the Court were an abuse of the
Court's power and an infringement upon the legislative process. See Jeffrey W. Stempel,
A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed
Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 181-87 (1988).
2 The summary judgment doctrine balances the need to dispose of controversies
quickly and efficiently against the litigants' right to a trial. In general, summary
judgment reflects the dilemma inherent in the very purpose of the Federal Rules: "to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. Civ. P.
1. Cf. OHIOR. Civ. P.1(B) (The Rules "shall be construed and applied to effect just results
by eliminating delay, unnecessary expense and all other impediments to the expeditious
administration ofjustice"). In particular, summary judgment threatens a party's Seventh
Amendment right to trial by jury. The courts, however, have established that when a
judge finds that there is "no genuine issue of material fact" as required by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56(c) or Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 56(C), no such right exists since
the party has no claim to bring before a court and hence cannot be deprived of any right
to trial. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 320 (1902); General Inv.
Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 139 N.E. 216, 219-20 (N.Y. 1923).
3 FED. R. Crv. P. 56(c).
4 For example, when the parties in a negligence action involving a car accident
disagree as to the color of the traffic light, a reasonable jury could find for either party,
and the answer would be outcome determinative. Thus, the color of the light raises a
genuine issue of material fact. See generally William W. Schwarzer, SUMMARYJUDGMENT
UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES: DEFINING GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FAcT, 99 F.R.D. 465
(1983).
5 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
6 See Paul v. Uniroyal Plastics Co., 575 N.E.2d 484, 487 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988)
("Generally, the complexity of a summary judgment motion lies not in application of
[the] standards, but in determining whethereachparty has produced sufficient evidence
to substantiate its contentions."). But cf. D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the
Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on the Supreme Court's New Approach to
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In this Note, the difficulties judges encounter in applying the Celotex
standards are illustrated through an examination of summary judgment
decisions in the United States Supreme Court and in Ohio courts. Ohio's judges
often look to the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for guidance in applying Ohio's summary judgment rule,7 and
summary judgment decisions of this state therefore exemplify the pitfalls that
the Supreme Court has created.
Trial court judges need standards which are more practical in application so
that the decison-making process will yield more consistent results. In an
attempt to encourage the development of such standards which can co-exist
with the Celotex trilogy, possible guidelines the court might use to assure the
most consistent, objective review of summary judgment motions are explored
in this Note. Following this introduction, Part II of this Note continues with a
survey of the legal background of summary judgment. In Part I, some of the
problems in applying the current doctrine are identified. Finally, proposals to
improve the doctrine are offered in Part IV.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE
A. Summary Judgment in England
Although its precursors can be traced to at least the 1200's,8 the modem
origin of America's summary judgment procedure began in England in the
mid-1800's.9 Nineteenth century merchants found England's pleading
Summary Judgment, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 36 (1988) (criticizing Cdotex for its lack of
analytical clarity).
7 Williams v. First United Church of Christ, 309 N.E.2d 924, 925 (Ohio 1974); T&S
LumberCo. v. Alta Constr. Co., 483 N.E.2d 1216,1219 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) ('Thejudicial
interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, upon which the Ohio Rules are
modeled, serve as an authoritative guide to the interpretation of the Ohio Rules."). But
cf. Gates Mills Inv. Co. v. Village of Pepper Pike, 392 N.E.2d 1316, 1323 (Ohio Ct. App.
1978) (finding that a Seventh Circuit interpretation of Federal Rule 56(c) "is not binding
upon state courts").
8Seegenerally, John A. Bauman, The Evolution of the Summary Judgment Procedure, 31
IND. L.J. 329 (1956) (detailing the history of summary judgment in England and Europe
and how the history influenced Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56). Bauman traces the
origin of summary judgment to England's Statute of Action, 11 Edw. (1283) (Eng.), the
Statute of Merchants, 13 Edw. (1285) (Eng.), and the Ordinance of the Staple 27 Edw. 3,
ch. 9 (1353) (Eng.). Id. at 330.
9 Robert W. Millar, Three American Ventures in Summary Civil Procedure, 38 YALE L.J.
193, 215 (1928) (providing a detailed perspective on summary judgment as applied
during the colonial period and through the mid-1800's and attributing the earliest
summary proceedings in America to statutes enacted in Virginia in 1732);seealso Charles
E. Clark & Charles U. Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE L.J. 423, 463 (1929)
(reviewing the summary proceeding statutes in existence in 1929).
Despite the existence of summary proceedings in America, as early as the 1700's,
England's Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 18 & 19 Vict., ch. 67 (1855)
(Eng.), serves as the template for today's Rule 56. See the Advisory Committee Note to
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requirements and discovery practices unbearably slow in yielding justice.10
Furthermore, unscrupulous debtors' lawyers used the existing system to
victimize merchants. These lawyers created unjust delay by exploiting a system
which lacked a method for determining the factual basis of a pleading prior to
trial.11
As the socio-economic structure of England shifted to a predominantly
merchant-class society, the merchants clamored for a speedy means to collect
debts and to dispense with sham defenses. 12 England responded by enacting
the Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act 13 The Act postponed entry
of judgment until after a hearing, and required the debtor to post security only
"as one of several alternatives available to a defendant who asked leave to
defend an action prior to the entry ofjudgment."14 If, however, the debtor could
not challenge the cause of action or failed to appear at the hearing, then the
court would summarily enter judgment against him.15 Initially, the Act limited
England's summary proceedings to claims concerning bills of exchange and
promissory notes;16 but, over approximately the next eighty years, applications
Rule 56 as originally promulgated; see also FLEMMING JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 233
(1965); 6 JAMES W. M. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.05 (2d ed. 1992);
10 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ETAL., FEDERAL PRACTICEAND PROCEDURE § 2711 (2d. ed. 1983).
10 Bauman, supra note 8, at 329-30.
1lid. at 332-34.
121d. at 329-30.
131n 1853, Lord Henry Brougham, a member of the Scottish bar, unsuccessfully
attempted to persuade parliament. He proposed a means of debt collection predicated
on the existing law in Scotland and was in the form of an ex parte proceeding that
assumed the creditor was entitled to execution against the debtor unless the debtor gave
a security which would suspend the charge pending a hearing. The proceeding was ex
parte in nature because the plaintiff would register his claim in an appropriate court.
Subsequently, the plaintiff would be entitled to "the ordinary methods of execution on
judgments." Bauman, supra note 8, at 336. Only after the process of executing the order
had begun did the defendant receive notice of the action and then have the opportunity
to raise a defense if he could post a security. Id. at 334-38.
Parliament received Lord Brougham's proposal with skepticism. The reasons were
varied, but the most significant one was that the rule was too stringent. In 1855, Sir
Henry Keating proposed a less stringent rule. The proposal '"had a generally favorable
reception from the bar since it was regarded as 'comparatively moderate and
reasonable' when compared to the 'startling measure proposed by Lord Brougham."
Id. (citations omitted). Parliament approved the proposal as the Summary Procedure on
Bills of Exchange Act which is also known as Sir Keating's Act. Summary Procedure on
Bills of Exchange Act (Sir Keating's Act), 1855,18 & 19 Vict., ch. 67 (Eng.).
14 Bauman, supra note 8, at 339.
15See id. at 338 (citing Keating's Act, 1855,18 & 19 Vict., ch. 67, § 1, Schedule A (Eng.)).
1618 & 19 Vict., ch. 67 (1855).
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of the proceedings expanded to the point of including virtually all civil causes
of action.17
B. Summary Judgment in the United States
1. Before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The development of summary proceedings in America was similar to that
in England. Initially, summary judgment only applied to a limited number of
causes of action.18 Gradually, however, the Rule became applicable to all civil
proceedings. 19 As early as 1732, Virginia had a summary process available in
its courts and, by the nineteenth century, many states also included summary
proceedings in their judicial systems.20
In 1911, the Ohio Supreme Court decided White v. Calhoun.21 In White, the
Ohio courts' inherent power to strike out sham answers22 was recognized, and
their authority to summarily dispose of cases without trial by jury, enabling
them to quickly provide plaintiffs with favorable judgments, was approved.23
Thus, White v. Calhoun marks the beginning of summary judgment in Ohio.24
Shortly thereafter, the Connecticut bar began to encourage its courts to adopt
a summary judgment rule. The most noted advocate involved in this effort was
17See Bauman, supra note 8, at 338.
18WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 2711; C. Christopher Brown, Summary Judgment in
Maryland, 38 MD. L. REV. 188, 191 (1978); Henry H. Fowler, Virginia Notice of Motion
Procedure, 24 VA. L. REV. 711, 717 (1938).
19Clark & Samenow, supra note 9, at 469; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee
notes.
20Clark & Samenow, supra note 9, at 463; Millar, supra note 9, at 215; Bauman, supra
note 8, at 343. Despite the prevalence of summary proceedings in the states, the federal
courts had no such proceeding and did not even apply state summary proceeding laws
until 1872. The Practice Conformity Act of June 1,1872, ch. 255, § 517 Stat. 196 (codified
at 28 U.S.C § 1652 (1988)) authorizes federal courts to conform practice and pleadings,
except in equity and admiralty cases, to those of the State in which the district court sits.
Thus, if that state had enacted a summary procedure, the federal court could apply it in
actions before the court. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 2711; see also United States
Gypsum Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 19 F. Supp. 767,768 (D.C.N.Y. 1937) (applying
the contemporaneous summary judgment procedure available in New York).
2194 N.E. 743 (Ohio 1911).
22 1d. at 743 (describing a sham answer as one good in form, but false in fact, and not
pleaded in good faith).
2 3 See id. at 744 (quoting Gostorfs v. Taafee, McCahill & Co., 18 Cal. 385 (1861)).
Interestingly, the basis of Ohio's summary judgment rule lies in a common law power
despite the fact that the summary judgment procedure has no common law origin. See
Millar, supra note 9, at 194.
2 4 Cf Clark & Samenow, supra note 9, at 463 (observing that Indiana's statute which
provided its courts with the same power is only the "bare embryo" of summary
judgment).
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Yale law professor Charles Clark. His advocacy succeeded and, in 1928, that
State adopted an extensive summary judgment rule.25
Clark followed up his efforts by writing an article to amplify his views on
Connecticut's summary judgment rule.26 Today that article serves as the
supplement to the Advisory Committee's notes on Rule 56, and Clark has
become renowned as the most influential voice in the development of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.27 The article contains a survey of all
then-existing summary proceeding statutes in the Unites States, and also the
law of England and Canadian provinces. Clark's opinion is dear: The courts
should make liberal use of summary judgment as a tool to protect plaintiffs
from unjust delay.28 He believed that, in addition to providing an effective
means of "preventing delays by defendants, and... securing speedy justice for
creditors[,]J 29 summary judgment would make the entire judicial process more
efficient. Furthermore, it would encourage creditors to resort to the courts to
satisfy debts because of new found confidence in the ability of the courts to
provide rapid justice.30
2. After the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Clark's influence on the federal rules, enacted in 1938,31 is explicitly manifest
in the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 56, which rule governs summary
2 5See generally Charles E. Clark, The New Summary Judgment Rule, 3 CONN. B.J. 1 (1929)
(outlining the rule and its purposes).
2 6Clark & Samenow, supra note 9. Charles Samenow was a student of Clark's and
co-authored the article.
27Charles Clark became an Assistant Professor of Law at Yale Law School in 1919.
By 1924, Clark became a Full Professor, and in 1929, he became the school's dean. Clark's
rapid rise at the school coincided with a rise in the school's prestige, and he played a
substantial role in the school's growing reputation. Clark also served as a judge for the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States from 1939 to 1963. That bench,
which included Learned Hand, August Hand, Thomas Swann and Jerome Frank, was
widely regarded as the finest in the country, if not the world. See MARVIN SCHICI,
LEARNED HAND's COURT 12 (1970).
But it is Clark's work as a Reporter to the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee
on Rules for Civil Procedure that has lead to his being recognized "as one of the giants
of the judicial reform movement of the first half of the century .. " Id. at 31. Clark was
the primary drafter of the Federal Rules that were enacted in 1938. He had served in
that role for three years and resumed it at the Court's request in 1942. Clark remained
as the Reporter until 1956.
For an extensive analysis of Clark's role in the formation of the Federal Rules, see
Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE
L.J. 914 (1976).
2 8See Clark & Samenow, supra note 9, at 469-71; see also Charles Clark, The Summary
Judgment, 36 MINN. L. REV. 567, 576-77 (1952) (advocating in favor of using summary
judgment).
2 9Clark & Samenow, supra note 9, at 423.
30Id. (citing Am. Jud. Soc. Bul. XIV (1919)).
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judgment.32 His philosophy is implicitly adopted in the sweeping
generalizations of Rule 56's language that suggests liberal applications.33 For
example, the Federal Rule's application to all civil claims without restriction is
indicative of the Clark imprimatur.34 Furthermore, section C of the rule also
evinces Clark's liberal influence.35 First, the courts are given authority to
summarily dispose of matters before them. Second, judges are given ample
discretion to determine whether they should exercise that authority. In
particular, judges exercise substantial discretion when determining whether a
"genuine issue of material fact" exists.36
Since the enactment of the federal rules, the United States Supreme Court
has seldom granted certiorari on cases raising issues about their application. 3 7
In 1944, however, the Court attempted to define the phrase "genuine issue of
material fact." In Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp.,38 counsel for the
plaintiffs/petitioners argued that "[t]o proceed to summary judgment,.. . [iut
must appear... either that the.., evidence is... too incredible to be accepted
by reasonable minds, or that, conceding its truth it is without legal probative
31 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective on September 16,1938. FED.
R. Civ. P. 86(a); McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61 (1939).
32
"For the history and nature of the summary judgment procedure... see Clark &
Samenow, The Summary Judgment (1929), 38 Yale L.J. 423." FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory
committee notes.
33 The federal rule states in part:
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon.... The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interroga-
tories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) is also relevant. It states in part:
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein.... When a motion for summary judgment is made and support-
ed as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavit, or an
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
34 See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) advisory committee notes.
35 See the text of FED. R. Civ. P. 56, supra note 33.
36 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
3 7See Stempel, supra note 1, at 100 n.32.
38321 U.S. 620 (1944).
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force .... "39 The Court seemed to agree. It held that a proper summary
judgment required "evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve
and which would require a directed verdict for the moving party."40
3. Current Summary Judgment Doctrine: The Celotex Trilogy
After Sartor and before 1986, Ohio and federal courts alike were cautious in
their use of summary judgment,41 denying its potential as envisioned by Dean
Clark. In 1986, however, the Court decided the Celotex trilogy of cases 42 and
established new, greatly liberalized standards for allowing summary
judgment. In 1991, Ohio adopted the Celotex framework in Wing v. Anchor
Media, Ltd., 43 and since then, the two jurisdictions have relied upon the same
standards to determine the absence of genuine issues of material fact, which
requires the court to enter judgment, as a matter of law, in favor of a moving
party.
a. Step One Towards Increasing Judicial Discretion
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.44 was a complex
antitrust case.45 The plaintiffs were American manufacturers who claimed that
the defendant Japanese electronics firms schemed to sell their products in Japan
at artificially high prices in order to sell their products in the United States at
artificially low prices.4 6 After several years of discovery, the defendants moved
for summary judgment.47 The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendant,48 but the court of appeals reversed.49
When the Supreme Court reviewed the matter, it found the scheme alleged
by the plaintiffs to be "implausible."50 The Court indicated that predatory
3 9Supplemental Brief for Petitioner at 17, Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321
U.S. 620 (1944) (No. 232) (quoting Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305,306 (5th Cir. 1940)).
40321 U.S. at 624.
4 1 See Associated Press v. United States Tribune Co., 326 U.S. 1, 6 (1945) (citing Sartor
v. Arkansas Natural Gas. Co., 321 U.S. 620 (1944)); accord Norris v. Ohio Standard Oil
Co., 433 N.E.2d 615,616 (Ohio 1982) ("[slummary judgment .... [m]ustbe awarded with
caution ... " (citations omitted)).
42See cases cited supra note 5.
43570 N.E.2d 1095,1099 (Ohio 1991).
44475 U.S. 574 (1986).
45See id. at 576-77.
4 61d. at 577-78.
471d.
48Id. at 579.
49475 US. at 580.
501d. at 587.
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pricing was a highly unlikely means to use in attempting to create a monopoly,
particularly in the context of a conspiracy.51 The Court further reasoned that
the inability of Japanese manufacturers to wrest away a market share sufficient
to justify the losses incurred by the twenty years of below-market pricing belied
the American manufacturers' claims of conspiracy.52
Matsushita was the first crack in the dam. The Court did not make any radical
changes to summary judgment doctrine,5 it merely opened the door to
opportunities for increased judicial discretion in granting summary judgments.
The Court weighed the evidence before it, determined that plaintiffs' claims
were implausible, and required them to "come forward with more persuasive
evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary."54
Accordingly, the Court found that the record presented no genuine issue for
trial and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether other
facts might raise a genuine issue.55
b. Step Two Towards a More Liberal Summary Judgment Doctrine
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,56 the Court further extended judges'
discretion by adopting the directed verdict standard to determine the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact.57 Willis Carto, the founder of Liberty Lobby,
brought an action against Jack Anderson, claiming that Anderson's magazine
published thirty libelous statements in an article concerning Carto.58 Anderson
moved for summary judgment, claiming that Carto could not raise any issue
as to actual malice because Anderson's magazine staff conducted research prior
to publication and believed in the truth and accuracy of the facts contained in
the alleged libelous article. 59
The district court agreed with Anderson and granted summary judgment.60
On appeal, the circuit court affirmed summary judgment as to 21 of the
statements but reversed summary judgment on the other nine. The court held
5lid. at 588-91.
521d. at 591-93.
53See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072,2083 (1992).
But see Marcy J. Levine, Summary Judgment: The Majority Undergoes a Complete Reversal
in the 1986 Supreme Court, 37 EMORY LJ. 171, 184-88, 191-96 (1988) (observing that
Matsushita was the culmination of a complete reversal in the Court's attitude towards
the use of summary judgment in antitrust cases).
54475 U.S. at 587.
55Id. at 597-98.
56477 U.S. 242 (1986).
5 71d. at 250.
581d. at 244-45
59 1d.
601d. at 246.
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that, despite the substantive law's requiring Carto to establish actual malice by
clear and convincing evidence, Carto did not have to meet the higher standard
to defeat Anderson's summary judgment motion.61 The court feared that
summary judgment determinations based on varying degrees of required
proof would involve a judge's impermissibly weighing the evidence. Thus, it
instead applied a lower standard to determine that a reasonable jury could find
in favor of Carto.62
Justice White delivered the Supreme Court's opinion, explaining that the
court of appeals erred in not considering the higher standard of proof. He stated
that the materiality of a fact must be determined in the context of the
substantive law.63 He also wrote that a genuine issue requires more than the
"mere existence of some alleged factual dispute."64 The essence of the inquiry is
"whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission
to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter
of law."6S
Anderson's equating the summary judgment standard to the directed verdict
standard followed the lead of the Matsushita Court. Just as Justice Powell
imposed a greater burden of proof on the Matsushita plaintiff who had an
implausible claim, Justice White also required a greater showing when a
plaintiff had a burden of establishing his claim by clear and convincing
evidence at trial.66 Thus, the Court remanded the case, providing yet another
yardstick by which a judge may measure whether an issue of material fact is
genuine.
As a result of Anderson67 and Matsushita,68 federal judges obtained the
authority to exercise greater discretion when deciding summary judgment and
a concomitant confidence that their decisions would withstand appeal.69 The
61477 U.S. at 246.
621d. at 247.
631d. at 248.
64id. at 247.
651d. at 252. The Court amplified its position by holding that "[tihe judge's inquiry.
unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors could find... that the plaintiff is entitled
to a verdict...." Id.
66 1n this respect, perhaps Matsushita is the more liberal decision of the two. Anderson
requires the judge to draw lines as to where evidence is "so one sided" based on the
substantive law at issue. 477 U.S. at 252. By comparison, Matsushita permits even greater
judicial discretion by permitting the judge to draw lines based on her own sense of what
constitutes an "implausible" claim without any external guidance such as substantive
laws provide. 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
67477 U.S. 242 (1986).
68475 U.S. 574 (1986).
69 See Levine, supra note 53, at 209.
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third case of the trilogy, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,70 addressed a different, but
related, issue. The Celotex Court identified the burden of proof borne by a
non-movant. While Matsushita and Anderson make it easier for federal judges
to grant summary judgment, Celotex makes it easier for defendants to obtain
summary judgment.
c. The Last Step
In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, the defendant-Corporation claimed that plaintiff
Myrtle Catrett failed to adduce evidence sufficient to establish her wrongful
death claim.71 The district court found the claim persuasive and granted
Celotex's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, 72 the circuit court
reversed summary judgment, reasoning that Celotex failed to produce
evidence of its own that would negate Catrett's claim. The Supreme Court73
then reversed the circuit court's decision.74
The Court permitted the defendant to prevail on summary judgment merely
by showing the defect in the plaintiff's claim, thus placing the onus on the
plaintiff to establish her case. Under Celotex, when the summary judgment
movant does not have the burden of proof at trial, that movant does not have
an affirmative burden of production in support of his motion.75 In other words,
the Court required defendant Celotex to be able to specify how plaintiff Catrett
failed to establish her claim, but the Court did not require Celotex to produce
evidence of its own to disprove Catrett's claim.
In dissent,76 Justice Brennan agreed with, and provided the most lucid
explanation of Celotex's shifting burdens analysis. The summary judgment
movant has the burden of establishing the nonexistence of a genuine issue.
This burden has two components: a burden of production and a burden of
70477 U.S. 317 (1986).
71The issue in Celotex concerns whether a genuine issue existed as required by FED.
R. CIv. P. 56(e). This standard is a corollary to FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c), and no case law exists
indicating any distinction between the two concerning the applicable standards for
determining the existence of such an issue.
72 Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
73 Celotex, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
74 1d. at 319.
75See infra notes 115-16; cf. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33, 39-40
(D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988) (reversing defendant Celotex's
summary judgment; but Celotex Corp. had adduced sufficient evidence to prevail
absent the plaintiff's effective rebuttal).
76477 U.S. at 329-37.
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persuasion. 77 The burden of production initially requires "the moving party to
make a prima fiwie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment"78
Determining whether this burden requires the movant to produce
independent evidence supporting the motion depends on the movant's burden
of persuasion at trial.79 For example, since a defendant typically does not have
a burden of persuasion at trial, the defendant who moves for summary
judgment usually can satisfy the motion's burden of production by specifically
identifying a fatal flaw in the plaintiff's claim, without producing separate
evidence negating plaintiff's claim. In contrast, when a plaintiff moves for
summary judgment she typically has the burden of persuasion at trial and
therefore must produce her own evidence identifying the absence of a genuine
issue in order to sufficiently support her motion.
If the moving party satisfies her initial burden of production, the burden then
shifts to the non-movant to produce evidence that will raise a genuine issue.80
In contrast, the burden of persuasion, with respect to the summary judgment
motion, always remains with the movant. The movant must first satisfy her
initial burden of production, however, before the court determines whether she
satisfied her burden of persuasion.81 Thus in any summary judgment decision,
the court focuses primarily on whether the movant has satisfied her burden of
production with little or no explicit attention to issues concerning the movant's
burden of persuasion.
d. Summary Judgment in Ohio
Enacted in 1959, Ohio's first summary judgment statute82 foreshadowed the
Anderson decision because it expressly incorporated the directed verdict
standard espoused by the Court.83 But the confluence of state and federal
77 d. at 330.
78 d. at 331.
791d.
80 d. at 330.
81477 U.S. at 330.
821965 OHIO LAWS 131 § 2311.041 (repealed 1971).
83 The subsequent amendments did not change Ohio's standard for determining
when genuine issues of material fact existed. Currently, Ohio's Rule states in part:
(C) Motion and proceedings thereon.... Summary judgment shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interroga-
tories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the
pending case, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the
action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No
evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule.
A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless reasonable minds can
come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party
against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, such party
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doctrine became complete after the Ohio Supreme Court decided Wing v.
Anchor Media, Ltd.84 In Wing, the court expressly adopted the shifting burdens
analysis announced in Celotex.85 Thus, after Wing, the standards of review for
both federal courts and Ohio courts became synonymous.86 In Jeries v.
Prudential Life Insurance Co.,87 the court set forth Ohio's standard:
[Slummary judgment shall only be granted where there exists no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment shall not be granted
unless it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds could come
to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party
against whom the motion is made. In reviewing a motion for summary
judgment, the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must
be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.
Temple v. Wean United, Inc., [267 N.E2d 267,274 (Ohio 1977)].
Moreover, upon motion for summary judgment... , the burden of
establishing that material facts are not in dispute, and that no genuine
issue exists, is on the [movant]. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co.,
[375 N.E.2d 46, 47 (Ohio 1978)]. However, a motion for summary
judgment forces the [non-movant] to produce evidence on any issue
for which that party bears the burden of production at trial. Wing v.
Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas, [570 N.E.2d 1095, 1096] paragaph three of
the syllabus citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
III. DIFFICULTIES IN APPLICATION
A. Problems Predicted
In contrast to the Celotex opinion, the Court was sharply divided over the
appropriate legal framework used in Matsushita and Anderson.89 In Matsushita,
being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly
in his favor.
OHio R. Civ. P. 56(C).
84570 N.E.2d 1095 (Ohio 1991).
85 1d. at 1096 (paragraph 2 of the court's syllabus); seealso Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc., 585
N.E.2d 384,394 (Ohio 1992) (WrightJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[olur
adoption of the Celotex standard implicitly incorpora ted [ the Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc.] standard as well .... ).
86See, e.g., Blaschak v. Union Say. Bank & Trust Co., No. 91-J-7, 1992 WL 247431, at
*3 (Ohio App. 7th Dist. Sept. 30,1992).
87No. 61992, 1991 WL 263662 (Ohio App. 8th Dist. Dec. 12, 1991).
881d. at *2. The Jeries court used the three authorities that are most frequently cited
by Ohio courts in their summary judgment opinions.
89The Celotex majority opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, included Justices
Marshall, Powell, and O'Connor. Justice White concurred while Justice Brennan filed a
dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined. The
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Justice Brennan joined Justice White's dissent,90 criticizing the majority's use
of "unnecessarily broad and confusing language."91 More specifically, they
feared the new standard would "undermine the doctrine that all evidence must
be construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment."92
In Anderson, Justices Brennan 93 and Rehnquist94 each wrote dissents
predicting critical problems for courts which would have to apply the directed
verdict standard when deciding a motion for summary judgment. Rehnquist
was concerned that the Court's new standard would be of little practical
effect.95 Brennan agreed and was also concerned that the new standard would
"transform what [was] meant to provide an expedited 'summary' procedure
into a full-blown paper trial on the merits.'96
B. Practical Problems in Adjudication
Out of the three opinions, one sentence is the source for the trial courts'
greatest consternation. The Anderson Court stated that a "judge's function is not
himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."97 In other words, a judge
must evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence without weighing its credibility.98
Perhaps courts silently decide99 whether the movant has carried his burden
of persuasion because the court must avoid the appearance of weighing the
Brennan dissent disagreed with the Court's application of the particular facts to the law,
but agreed with the legal framework that the Court employed. Only Justice Stevens,
who filed a separate dissent, did not endorse the Court's legal framework in Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,337-39 (1986).
90475 U.S. 574, 598-607 (1986).
9lid. at 601.
921d.
93477 U.S. 242, 257-68 (1986).
941d. at 268-73.
95 Chief Justice Rehnquist opined:
It seems to me that the Court's decision today unpersuasively answers
the question presented, and in doing so raises a host of difficult and
troubling questions for which there may well be no adequate solutions.
What is particularly unfair is that the mess we make is not, at least in
the first instance, our own to deal with; it is the district courts and courts
of appeals that must struggle to clean up after us.
Id. at 268.
961d. at 266-67.
97 1d. at 249.
98477 U.S. at 255.
99 See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
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evidence before it.100 Anderson requires the judge to determine whether the
evidence can persuade a reasonable jury. Celotex requires the judge to
determine whether the evidence persuades the judge. Thus, an inherent
difficulty in the summary judgment standard is that, in theory, courts must
determine whether a party has produced sufficient evidence to satisfy the
burden of production without considering the persuasiveness of the evidence
produced. This is an impossibility.
Both Justice Rehnquist and Justice Brennan recognized the inherent
difficulty in the standard set forth by the majority. The Court created a standard
that would be difficult, if not impossible, to accurately apply. Further, while
Brennan and Rehnquist noted the practical difficulties that the new standard
would impose on judges, others have noted the potentially detrimental effects
of this standard on the entire adversarial process. 101
1. A Change in Effectiveness
Since the Court announced the Celotex trilogy, commentators have expressed
concerns about the validity of shifting the emphasis from plaintiff to defendant
in summary judgments.102 When the Advisory Committee adopted Rule 56,
they noted its success in New York. 103 At the time, plaintiffs constituted a large
majority of the summary judgment movants.104 Furthermore, Dean Clark
10OSee supra text accompanying note 97.
10 1As the Honorable Judge Jack B. Weinstein observed:
The Supreme Court's recent [Celotex] trilogy of cases interpreting Rule
56 undoubtedly will add to the difficulties plaintiffs face in getting to
trial. The decisions essentially allow a defendant to require the plaintiff
quickly to assemble and present its case at great expense in order to
survive a motion for summary judgment. Perhaps Dean Carrington's
proposal to amend Rule 56... could restore balance to this situation.
Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers
to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901,1914 (1989); see also Risinger, supra note
6, at 41-42; seegenerally Samuel Issacharoff & George Lowenstein, Second Thoughts About
Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73 (1990); Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary
Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770
(1988).
102See articles cited supra note 101. Prior to the Celotex trilogy, the burdens of proof
seemed to favor plaintiffs by requiring defendants to affirmatively prove a negative in
order to establish that a plaintiff's complaint did not raise a genuine issue of material
fact. After Celotex, the shifting burdens analysis now appears to favor defendants. But
see infra Part III.B.1.
103FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee notes.
104A search on WESTLAW surveying all New York cases available for 1935 and 1936
which included the term "summary judgment" in their synopsis revealed that, out of
234 cases, 152 involved only plaintiff motions for summary judgment. Fifty-nine cases
involved only defendant motions for summary judgment, and twenty-three cases
involved both parties' making motions for summary judgment. This survey is consistent
with Dean Clark's finding in Connecticut for the years 1925-1926. Charles E. Clark, Fact
Research in Law Administration, 2 CONN. B.J. 211,218-19 (1928). Clark and Samenow also
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clearly viewed sunmary judgment as a tool to protect plaintiffs.105 Given this
background, the shift in emphasis to the defendant might appear radical.
Contrary to any apparent radical shift, however, the Court merely increased
the power of a tool that already favored the defendant. An empirical review of
summary judgment decisions in federal district courts in Ohio confirms that
making summary judgment more attainable by defendants does not mean
plaintiffs have suffered.106 To the contrary, the days of the summary judgment
being a plaintiff's weapon had long since passed when the Court decided the
Celotex trilogy.
As illustrated in the table below, research revealed 309 summary judgment
opinions for the six years preceding the Celotex trilogy.107 During that period,
plaintiffs moved for summary judgment in 11% of the opinions that did not
involve motions by both parties, and defendants accounted for 89% of the
motions. In comparison, research for the six years following Celotex revealed
319 summary judgment opinions.108 During this period, plaintiffs moved for
summary judgment in 13% of the opinions that did not involve motions by
both parties, and defendants accounted for 87% of the motions. Thus, the
Celotex trilogy does not appear to have inspired defendants' counselors to move
for summary judgment more often than before. Furthermore, even if the trilogy
did increase the number of motions made, the influence appears to have
affected plaintiff and defendant movants in a similar fashion rather than
providing defendants with any greater incentive to move for summary
judgment.
The Celotex trilogy has, however, altered the effectiveness of summary
judgment as a defendants' tool. Prior to Celotex, when an opinion involved only
point out that New York's statistics at the time were comparable to Connecticut's. Clark
& Samenow, supra note 9, at 469 n.324.
105Clark & Samenow, supra note 9, at 469-70.
106Because this review is limited to those decisions reported on WESTLAW, it is not
exhaustive in its scope; rather it merely touches on the "tip of the iceberg". See Steven
Steinglass, Section 1983 Litigation in the Ohio Courts: An Introduction for Ohio Lawyers and
Judges, 41 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 407, 424 (1993) (stating that a review of reported appellate
decisions concerning 1983 litigation in Ohio is instrucive but not exhaustive). Many
summary judgment motions are ruled on without opinion or publication; others never
are resolved because the case reaches settlement or other adjudication first.
Nevertheless, despite the limited scope of the review contained in this Note, the results
are consistent with those of other similar, more detailed and authoritative reviews. Cf.
William P. McLauchlan, An Empirical Study of the Federal Summary Judgment Rule, 6 J.
LEGAL STuDIEs 427 (1977) (providing an authoritative approach to the empirical study
of summary judgments); see also Issacharoff & Lowenstein, supra note 101, at 91-94
(analyzing all summary judgment decisions made in the federal district courts during
the first quarter of 1988).
107Search of WESTLAW, federal district court database and the following query:
"Co(Ohio) & sy("Summary Judgment") & da(bef 1986) & da(aft 1979)".
1 08Search of WESTLAW, federal district court database and the following query:
"Co(Ohio) & sy("Summary Judgment") & da(bef 1993) & da(aft 1986)".
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one party moving for summary judgment, 8% of the motions resulted in the
plaintiff prevailing. Of all those summary judgments entered during this time,
53% favored the defendant After Celotex, 10% of these opinions favored
plaintiffs and 69% favored the defendant. The difference in the effect on
defendants becomes more apparent when comparing the relative rates of their
motions being granted pre-Celotex. Before Celotex, courts granted 59% of
defendant motions for summary judgment. After Celotex, courts granted 79%
of defendant motions for summary judgment.
The 20% difference in defendant success rates is substantial; however, claims
that Celotex shifted power from plaintiffs to defendants are less forceful in light
of the relative plaintiff success for these pre- and post- Celotex years. Between
1979 and 1986, the courts granted 74% of plaintiff motions for summary
judgment Between 1986 and 1993, the courts granted 77% of plaintiff motions.
1/1/79 - 12/31/85 1/1/87 - 12/31/92
Total Number of Cases 309 319
Cases with only I Movant 214 235
Percentage of Plaintiff Motions 11% 13%
Percentage of Defendant Motions 89% 87%
Percentage of all Motions Granted in 8% 10%
Favor of Plaintiff
Percentage of all Motions Granted in 53% 69%
Favor of Defendant
Percentage of Plaintiff Motions Granted 74% 77%
Percentage of Defendant Motions Granted 59% 79%
Thus, while defendants prevail on their motions more often than before Celotex,
the decision merely made the playing field more even rather than tipping it in
favor of defendants. On the other hand, when considering the effect of the
trilogy on the power of summary judgment as a tool for defendants, the fact
that defendants are more likely to prevail now than prior to Celotex is probably
more significant than the relative likelihood of plaintiffs' and defendants'
success.
2. Protecting the Merchant Class
After Celotex, the shift that occurred in federal courts did not transfer power
from plaintiff to defendant 109, but rather, it increased protection for the
merchant class.110 England's Parliament enacted its summary judgment statute
109 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Federal Rules Fifty Years Later: Discovery Vices and
Trans-substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237,
2241 (1989).
11OSee Stempel, supra note 1, at 161 ("Defendants are disproportionately comprised of
society's 'haves': banks, insurance companies, railroads, business organizations,
governments and government agencies.").
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primarily to protect merchants.111 From this basis, many of the states as well
as the federal courts adopted the procedure.112 Interestingly, proponents of the
new procedure spoke in terms of speed and justice to litigants rather than
specifying the practical benefits that were intended to inure to the merchant
class. 113
In describing the burden of production placed upon either party in a
summary judgment proceeding, the language of Celotex is ostensibly
neutral.114 Later in its opinion, however, the Court implicates that summaryjudgment might favor the moving party.115 The Court stated that a party may
obtain summary judgment without "show[ing] the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact, even with respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party
bears the burden of proof."1 6 The Court continued to explain that "the burden
on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing'--that is, pointing out to
the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the
non-moving party's case."117
Rehnquist's Celotex opinion remained consistent with the rhetoric
previously used to describe the burdens of summary judgment. His doctrine
assigned burdens without regard to the nature of the parties except for their
adversarial relationship as a movant and non-movant.118 Despite his neutral
language, however, in practice the new burden becomes clear. Whereas the old
standard, applied by the circuit court, resulted in finding that a genuine issue
of material fact existed,119 the Court's new standard worked to protect the
defendant Celotex Corporation, i.e., the "merchant class."
111 See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
112Supra text accompanying note 9.
113 See, e.g., Robert L. Willis, A Proposed Summary Judgment Statute for Ohio, 19 OHIo
ST. L.J. 1, 22-23 (1958).
114 As stated in Celotex:
Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights
of persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in
fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the
rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in
the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and
defenses have no factual basis.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
115 See generally Elizabeth T. Collins, Note, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett: Lessening the Moving
Party's Burden for Summary Judgment ? 17 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 293 (1987).
116 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. But cf. Adickes v. SI-I. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,157 (1970)
(requiring defendant to "foreclose the possibility" of a conspiracy in order to prevail on
its motion for summary judgment).
117477 U.S. at 325.
118Id. at 327; supra note 114.
119See Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181, 184 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
rev'd sub nom. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (citing National Ass'n of Gov't
Employees v. Campbell, 593 F.2d 1023, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("Facts not conclusively
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England's summary judgment was designed to protect merchants from
sham defenses. 120 Today's summary judgment, after the Celotex trilogy, is
designed to protect merchants from sham claims. The courts have avoided the
appearance of making such "political" 121 decisions by placing emphasis on the
use of summary judgment as a means to a more efficient justice system.
Certainly, the "process" purpose is at least as important as the "political"
purpose, and the best justification for the rhetoric is the fact that the former
purpose serves the latter.
Rehnquist's rhetoric not only camouflages the "political" aspects of the
decision, but it also maintains the fiction that rules of procedure are
non-partisan. 122 Regardless of Rehnquist's skillful draftsmanship, his position
is difficult for courts to maintain because rather than maintaining a
non-partisan process, Celotex affirms the original intent of the rule to protect
merchants. In fact, when courts attempt to maintain a non-partisan quality to
the rule, it can become a primary source of confusion in the application of a
fairly simple rule.123
In general, rules of procedure should be non-partisan, 124 but as with
everything else in law, there is always an exception. Summary judgment does
not need to be constrained by any attempts at maintaining the appearance of
being non-partisan. There are other checks available to assure that the
application of summary judgment does not unduly infringe on the adversary's
opportunities for equal justice.12 5 If the courts and legislators address summary
demonstrated, but essential to the movant's claim, are not established merely by his
opponent's silence; rather the movant must shoulder the burden of showing
affirmatively the absence of any meaningful factual issue.")).
120 See supra text accompanying note 12.
121 See Stempel, supra note 1, at 161. The term "political" is borrowed from Professor
Stempel's article. He describes the word not as referring to an overtly partisan decision
that favors a particular party, but rather as a decision that significantly affects the
distribution of "social welfare and power in society." Id.
122See id. ("All rules [of civil procedure] are probably inherently political.").
123 See case cited supra note 6.
124 See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions:
An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 2067, 2093 (1989).
125Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. V (due process clause); U.S. CONST. amend. VII (right to
trial by jury); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (due process clause); FED. R. CIv. P. 11
(providing sanctions againstattomeys making frivolous claims or, in this case, motions);
see also John F. Lapham, Note, Judgment Before the Completion of Discovery: A Proposed
Revision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (f), 24 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 253, 279-81 (1990).
Additionally, the court may utilize its power under FED. R. CIv. P. 16 to monitor the
conduct of the parties prior to trial and assure that plaintiffs have adequate opportunity
to realize their due process rights and that defendants do not abuse the power of
summary judgment as a weapon for delay or short-cut 'justice'.
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judgment as it is-a defensive tool t26-then they will be able to develop clear
guidelines that judges can consistently apply.
3. A Threat to the Judicial Process
Undoubtedly, the Celotex trilogy has changed the law's perspective on
summary judgmenL127 Whether the panoramic perspective is positive or
negative, the details remain troubling. In particular, current summary
judgment doctrine threatens the integrity of the judicial process because of the
discretion a judge must now exercise in deciding the motion.
Anderson1 28 and Matsushita29 set forth a seemingly impossible standard for
determining the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Any effort to
weigh the sufficiency of evidence without evaluating its credibility can only
result in a judge's making a highly subjective determination. Justice Holmes
believed that the law may be more a matter of experience than reason,130 but
it is reason which provides the assurance that the law provides justice. Without
manageable guidelines, litigants are left to rely only on their judge's own sense
of fairness. Of course, judges should rely on their sense of fairness when
making summary judgment determinations, but they also should rely on
practical guideposts to allow litigants a better opportunity to predict the
judge's decision.
Matsushita is an example of how apparently arbitrary jurisprudence can
threaten the integrity of summary judgment.131 Remarkably, the Court relied
on its own economic theories to assess the implausibility of the plaintiffs'
argument.132 The Court explained in detail why the alleged scheme was
contradictory to the experts' views on sound business practices; but, it did not
126Even when used by plaintiffs, summary judgment is used to defend against sham
defenses.
127 See City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa. v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268,273 (8th
Cir. 1988) ("In any case, whatever the meaning of our earlier cases, [after the Celotex
trilogy]... we should be somewhat more hospitable to summary judgments than in the
past.").
128477 U.S. 242 (1986).
129475 U.S. 574 (1986).
130See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE PATH OF THE LAW, IN COLLECrED LEGAL PAPERS
167, 172-95 (1920); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("General propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision will
depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise.").
131Like Celotex, the Matsushita Court addressed whether a genuine issue for trial was
present as required in FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e); but as discussed in note 71, supra, the
standards are indistinguishable from those required by FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
132 See, e.g., 475 U.S. at 604 (WhiteJ. dissenting) (stating that the majority "consistently
assumes that petitioners valued profit-maximization over growth[,] ... [and] that this
is an assumption that should be argued to the factfinder, not decided by the Court'); see
also Stempel, supra note 1, at 112-14.
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draw upon the views of the experts that the parties submitted in the affidavits
of record. Instead, the Court ultimately relied upon its own business sense.133
Dissenting, Justice White argued that the Court's establishing a judge's
authority to weigh the evidence in making a summary judgment determination
was unprecedented. 134 Regardless of whether the Court utilized the proper
means to expand the judge's role,135 it certainly moved the doctrine in the
direction that Dean Clark intended. Yet, while Clark may have wanted judges
to have more discretion in applying summary judgment, it is doubtful that he
envisioned the expansive role that Matsushita created.136
The problem of judges' exercising excessive discretion becomes even more
acute when the summary judgment determination is based on affidavits. First,
although the Rule requires that an affidavit set forth "specific facts"137 to raise
genuine issues, the Court has acknowledged the difficulty in discerning the
difference between specific facts and conclusory allegations.138 Second, when
interpreting an individual's claim on an affidavit, the judge must evaluate the
credibility of the claim in order to determine the sufficiency of the claim.139
In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,140 an affidavit presented both
problems at once. Peggy Kay Peterson was a member of the National Wildlife
133Se 475 U.S. at 588-95.
134 See id. at 601 (WhiteJ. dissenting) ('If the Court intends to give every judge hearing
a motion for summary judgment in an antitrust case the job of determining if the
evidence makes the inference of conspiracy more probable than not, it is overturning
settled law.").
135 Professor Stempel contends that the Anderson Court should have effected its
changes upon summary judgment through the procedures set forth in the Rules
Enabling Act, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982)), rather than
through the radical rule re-interpretation made by a sharply divided Court. Stempel,
supra note 1, at 181-87.
136 1n 1985, the Civil Rules Committee began to review Rule 56 with the intent to
increase its effect. Professor Paul Carrington, who was the Reporter for the Advisory
Committee on the Civil Rules, noted that the Cdotex trilogy may have "made Rule 56 a
more powerful engine than the Civil Rules Committee contemplated when it first
commenced re-study of the rule in 1985." Carrington, supra note 124, at 2093. The same
comment possibly can be made with respect to Dean Clark's intent.
137FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e); OHIO R. CIV. P. 56(E).
138Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871,889 (1990) ("At the margins there is
some room for debate as to how 'specific' must be the 'specific facts' that Rule 56(e)
requires in a particular case.").
139A judge determines whether an affiant's claim can persuade a reasonable jury to
find in favorof thenon-moving party; thus, the strengthof the claim is atleastan implicit
factor in the judge's consideration. To this extent, the judge cannot avoid evaluating the
claim's credibility. As a result, the judge must base his decision on considerations
contrary to the Court's mandate to draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the
non-movant. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,655 (1962); accord Williams v.
First United Church of Christ, 309 N.E.2d 924, 925 (Ohio 1974).
140497 U.S. 871 (1990).
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Federation. 141 In order for the organization to have standing to sue the
defendant Bureau of Land Management (BLM), it had to show that Peterson
had been "'adversely affected or aggrieved... within the meaning of [the]
relevant statute .. . .,' 142 BLM had taken action that would allow public lands
to be open for mining activities.143 The plaintiffs claimed that BLM's action
contravened a statute because BLM failed to provide adequate notice of its
action.144 In support of the claim, Peterson submitted an affidavit stating that
her "enjoyment of federal lands, particularly those in the vicinity of [the land
in question] ... had been... adversely affected ..... 145
BLM moved for summary judgment.146 It asserted that its action concerned
an area limited to 4,500 acres, while the area described in Peterson's affidavit
covered two million acres. BLM maintained that Peterson failed to specify that
she enjoyed the particular 4,500 acres at issue. The district court agreed and
ordered summary judgment in favor of the defendant.147
On appeal, however, the circuit court found that the affidavit did raise a
genuine issue of material fact. The court found the facts averred to be sufficient
because "[i]f Peterson was not referring to the lands in this 4500 acre area, her
allegation of impairment to her use and enjoyment would be meaningless, or
pejurious ... .148
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court decided that the affidavit was missing
facts that the Court could not presume. 149 In contrast, the dissent felt that "the
allegations contained in the.., affidavit, in the context of the record as a whole,
were adequate to defeat a motion for summary judgment. 150 The dissent
added that when considering particular assertions in light of the entire
affidavit, a judge is not necessarily presuming facts "that are neither stated nor
implied simply because without them the plaintiff would lack standing."151
Although the three courts remained silent on the issue, their disagreement
revolved around the credibility of the affidavit. In this case, the credibility of
141 d. at 880.
142 d. at 883 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976)).
143 d. at 885.
144 d. at 879.
145497 U.S. at 886.
146Id. at 881.
147National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327,331 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd, 878
F.2d 422 (1989), rev'd, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
14 8National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd, 497
U.S. 871 (1990) (emphasis added).
149497 U.S. at 889.
1 50 d. at 902.
151d at 903-04.
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the affidavit determined the sufficiency of the affidavit Thus the Court reached
a just result, but impliedly violated the Anderson standard in the process.
Lujan's history of divergent views highlights the difficulties judges face
when applying the Anderson standard. Ohio's courts have had similar
difficulties applying Anderson. While Lujan demonstrates judges and justices
making very subjective determinations where credibility is an inherent issue
in their consideration, Shilling v. Mobile Analytical Services, Inc.,152 illustrates
Ohio judges hiding behind a substantive law issue in order to avoid the trap
of evaluating the sufficiency of evidence without weighing its credibility.
Suspicious that his drinking water was contaminated with gasoline, plaintiff
John Shilling hired the defendant corporation to test the water for contaminants
in October, 1985.153 The defendant did not find any contaminants in the water;
so Shilling and his family continued to drink the water. Two years later, in
October, 1987, Shilling had it tested again. The defendant performed the test,
and the results were negative. Approximately two months later, Shilling then
had another laboratory test the water again, and that test indicated that
gasoline was mixed in the water.154
When a physician determined that Shilling had multiple sclerosis, Shilling
subsequently filed a negligence cause of action against the defendant. The
defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Shilling failed
to establish that his drinking the contaminated water caused his illness.155 To
oppose the motion, Shilling offered the affidavit of Dr. Singer, a Ph.D.,
neurotoxicologist/psychologist. 156 The affidavit attributed Shilling's illness to
drinking the gasoline contaminated water.157
The trial court cited an Ohio Supreme Court precedent and stated that,
absent testimony from a "medical witness,"158 the issue was one for the trier of
fact. Then the court determined that a "medical witness" was limited to a
medical doctor.159 Thus, the court refused to consider the expert's affidavit
because he was a Ph.D. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendant, and the court of appeals affirmed.160
After reviewing the expert's impressive credentials, the supreme court
decided that Dr. Singer was qualified to offer the requisite expert testimony
152602 N.E.2d 1154 (Ohio 1992).
153 d. at 1155.
154Id.
155Id.
1561d.
157602 N.E.2d at 1155.
158Id. (quoting the syllabus of Darnell v. Eastman, 261 N.E.2d 114 (Ohio 1970)).
1591d.
160 Id. at 1156.
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and met the definition of a "medical witness."161 The court stated that the issue
before it was whether a Ph.D. neurotoxicologist/psychologist could satisfy the
definition of being a medical witness.162 Yet, despite its affirmative holding,
the court's rationale did not address the broader issue. Instead, the court
focused on Dr. Singer's personal credentials to determine that he was qualified
to testify.
While the Shilling court expressly determined that Dr. Singer was qualified,
it impliedly determined that he was credible-at least to the extent that the
testimony was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. In its analysis,
the court never discussed whether any other non-medical doctor would be
competent to testify. The court only focused on Dr. Singer's unique
qualifications.
Although the Shilling court probably provided substantial justice and some
basis for holdings in analogous cases, its decision ignored the Anderson
standard. A judge might find a qualified expert not credible, but the judge
cannot find an expert to be credible without deciding the expert is qualified.
Perhaps a formalist can distinguish between the issues of whether an expert is
qualified and whether an expert is credible, but the realist recognizes that one
could no more clearly distinguish whether Oedipus spent the night with his
mother or his lover.
4. The Changing Standard
Without more definitive guidelines on which to rely, one trend that has been
fairly consistent in the courts is that the weight of the evidence will be affected
by the subject matter before the court.163 Of course, the courts have not
announced this distinction because it does not comport with traditional,
across-the-board applications of procedural devices. Once again, however, this
attempt to treat summary judgment as a completely neutral device results in
great confusion.
One of the dilemmas summary judgment poses is whether the trial court's
decision is solely a matter of law or whether it also includes findings of fact.
The civil rules appear to clearly address this issue.164 The statutory language
dictates that trial courts must decide summary judgment motions "as a matter
of law."165 Notwithstanding this mandate, trial courts must make at least a
preliminary finding of facts to determine whether the evidence is insufficient
1611d. at 1155.
162602 N.E.2d at 1155.
163 See infra text accompanying notes 170-87 and 228-36.
164 Compare OHIO R. Civ. P. 56 (judgment as a matter of law) with OHIO R. Civ. P. 52
(findings of fact by the court).
165OHIO R. CIV. P. 56(C); supra note 83.
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to raise a genuine issue.166 In short, the statement that summary judgment is a
finding as a matter of law is yet another legal fiction. In practice, summary
judgment reflects a judge's determination that the facts, as she perceives them,
are insufficient for a party to win his case at trial.
Thus, in their proper efforts to reach just results, judges render summary
judgments that may warp various doctrines to support their positions.167 The
decisions are clearly fact driven, and the existing doctrine merely becomes an
obstacle for the judge to negotiate when making a difficult decision. 168
Moreover, the decision itself is often made difficult only because of the standard
that hinders the judge.169
Two types of claims which illustrate the fact-driven nature of summary
judgment determinations are product liability claims and public official
defamation claims. 170 These claims are exceptionally illustrative because
product liability law generally protects plaintiffs171 while public official
166This issue also raises significant difficulties for the appellate court. The appellate
court must determine whether it is reviewing a finding of fact or law in order to establish
its standard of review. This confusion is reflected in Ohio's decisions which enunciate
virtually every known standard of review depending on the particular decision being
read. See AAAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment
Corp., 553 N.E.2d 597,599 (Ohio 1990) (abuse of discretion); American Energy Servs. v.
Lekan, 598 N.E.2d 1315, 1317 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (independent review); Fortman v.
Dayton Power & Light Co., 609 N.E.2d 1296,1299 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (de novo); Smith
v. Wook Kang, No. CA-7003,1987 WL 11868, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 524 N.E.2d
506 (Ohio 1988) (plain error).
16 7Compare King v. Avila, 760 F. Supp. 681,682 (N.D. 111. 1989) (holding that defendant
police officer's affidavit sufficiently supported defendant's motion for summary
judgmentbecause even though affidavit was not based on officer's personal knowledge,
it was based on his personal knowledge of his partner's statement) with FED. R. Civ. P.
56(e) ("supporting ... affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence .... ) and FED. R. EvID. 802 ('hearsay is not
admissible....") and WRIGHTETAL., supra note 9, § 2738 ("Because the policy of Rule 56(e)
is that the judge should consider any material that would be admissible at trial, the rules
of evidence and the exceptions thereto determine what averments the affidavit may
contain.').
168Judges may also stretch doctrine when they are denying summary judgment. See,
e.g., Morris v. Children's Hospital Medical Ctr., 597 N.E.2d 1110, 1114, 1116 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1991) (allowing plaintiff minor to survive summary judgment by holding conduct
of physician and nurse to a standard of negligence rather than medical malpractice).
169 See discussion of Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), supra text
accompanying notes 140-51.
17OPublic official defamation law provides the most extreme example of defamation
law's protection of defendants, but the protection also extends to defendants in
defamation cases involving public figures and private persons. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Frank,
573 N.E.2d 609, 613, 616 (Ohio 1991) (private person); Stepien v. Franklin, 528 N.E.2d
1324, 1328-29 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (public figure).
171Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568,577 (Ohio 1981); Greenman
v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897,901 (Cal. 1962); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 697 (5th ed. 1984).
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defamation law generally protects defendants.172 Thus when the court must
decide a summary judgment motion, it considers the relative rights of the
parties based upon the policies driving the substantive law.173
When a defendant moves for summary judgment against a public official
who claims defamation, the defendant has two substantial advantages. First,
the public official plaintiff must adduce clear and convincing evidence to
prevail at trial,174 a burden higher than that placed on most civil litigants. 175
Thus, the standard to survive summary judgment is also higher and defendants
are more likely to prevail. Second, defendants who allegedly published
defamatory material have First Amendment rights at stake,176 and the court is
exceptionally protective of these rights.177 Obviously, the clear and convincing
standard was established to protect precisely the First Amendment rights
involved, and should therefore be a sufficient basis of protection for the
defendant. Nevertheless, courts consistently single out the First Amendment
concerns when making summary judgment determinations in these cases.178
In contrast, the intent of product liability law is to protect plaintiffs. 179
Furthermore, it is difficult to compare the two types of actions because the facts
are so dissimilar. One particularly noteworthy distinction is the proximate
cause requirement of strict liability.180 Proximate cause is one of the most
difficult elements a defendant must address in order to succeed on his
summary judgment motion. Arguably, this element alone could explain the
difference between the rates of summary judgment in strict liability and
defamation cases rather than any policy implications underlying the respective
172See Perez v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 520 N.E.2d 198, 202 (Ohio 1988),
cert. denied, 488U.S. 870 (1988); Grau v. Kleinschmidt, 509 N.E.2d 399,403-05 (Ohio 1987);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTONAL LAw § 12-12, at 861-72 (2d ed. 1988).
173 E.g., Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989,998 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829 (1985)
("Given the ease with which [Title VII] suits may bebrought and the energy and expense
required to defend such actions, we believe the trial judge properly granted summary
judgment.").
174perez, 520 N.E.2d ast 202
175 See Grau, 509 N.E.2d at 403-05.
176 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,499 (1984); see
also TRIBE, supra note 172.
177Varanese v. Gall, 518 N.E.2d 1177,1180-81 (Ohio), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1206 (1988)
(citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,508 (1984)).
178See id.; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986); St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,730-32 (1968); Moriarity v. Lippe, 294 A.2d. 326,330-31 (Conn.
1972).
179See cases and treatise cited supra note 171.
180See Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 267,270 (Ohio 1977); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2307.71 et seq. (Anderson 1991).
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laws.181 The contrast is heightened by the fact that, in public official defamation
cases, plaintiffs must prove the defendant's state of mind with convincing
clarity,182 and, after Anderson, it is exceptionally difficult for public official
defamation plaintiffs to survive summary judgment motions.183 A more
plausible explanation might be that both factors contribute to the discrepancy.
Due to the policy implications inevitably involved and the vagueness of the
concept, the issue of proximate cause is one where a judge can exercise
enormous discretion in her finding.184 At the summary judgment stage, the
degree of discretion a judge chooses to exercise may well be influenced by her
innate sense of fairness. That sense of fairness is not completely arbitrary, but
rather is shaped by the nature of the claim before her.
Part of the judge's decision-making process includes a determination of
which party is apt to be more harmed by denying a trial of the facts.185 In part,
it is an exercise of human compassion when a judge decides that a newspaper
is more likely to be harmed by the ordeal of a trial than the allegedly defamed
public official. 186 Conversely, the judge may be considerably more sympathetic
to the plight of the punch-press operator whose hand is severed in a
manufacturer's machine. 187
To recapitulate, the problems posed by the current standard that courts
employ when deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists are
multifarious. At its most abstract level, summary judgment determinations are
undergirded with a tension between the interests in obtaining fast resolution
to controversies and maintaining the non-movant's right to due process. At a
181After conducting a WESTLAW search for all defamation cases which involved
summary judgment review in Ohio's appellate courts since 1986, 42 opinions were
retrieved. In every case, the defendant was the movant, and the defendant prevailed in
90% of the cases. None of the cases involved partial summary judgment on the issue of
defamation. In contrast, after conducting a similar search for products liability cases, 21
opinions were retrieved, and defendants only prevailed in 67% of those decisions. The
two searches were conducted using the following parameters:
1) The Defamation cases: Database: Oh-cs, Query: 'To(237) & "summary
judgment" & da(aft 1986) & da(bef 1993)"
2) The Product Liability Cases: Database: Oh-cs, Query: 'To (313A) & "summary
judgment" & da(aft 1986) & da(bef 1993)".
182 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (requiring proof of actual
malice).
183 Levine, supra note 53, at 190-91,198-200.
184 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 171, § 41, 42, at 263-64, 272-75.
185See, e.g., Volk v. Multi-Media, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 157,162 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (finding
that plaintiff is not precluded from trial when the "ineptness and sloppiness" of his
attorney lead to missing a notice deadline that was a prerequisite of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); see also case cited supra note 173.
186 E.g., Varanese v. Gall, 518 N.E.2d 1177, 1180-81 (Ohio 1988).
187 E.g., Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 1982) (reversing lower
court's granting and affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant).
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more base level, judges may so warp their application of the current standard
that it threatens our judicial system's integrity.
IV. APPROACHES TOWARDS CONSISTENCY
Part of our sense of justice includes swift resolution of controversies. 188 This
aspect of justice provides the noble, ideological justification for increasing the
power of summary judgment. For all its idealism, however, there have been
doubts as to whether the new standard has indeed increased judicial efficiency
and therefore justice.189 Perhaps the fastest way to resolve disputes is through
settlement.190 Perhaps the greatest obstacle to reaching resolution is the process
of discovery.191 Summary judgment may impede the first and exacerbate the
second. 192 Any new guidelines that the courts develop should attempt to avoid
these traps in order to preserve the integrity of the adversarial process.
The first step in developing manageable standards for determining whether
a genuine issue of material fact exists is recognizing that summary judgment
is a unique procedure which warrants treatment unlike other rules of
procedure. Whether employed by plaintiffs or defendants, summary judgment
is a defensive weapon.193 If courts or legislators can focus on this bias rather
than attempt to hide it in non-partisan clothing, then clearer, more productive
guidelines can be established. Similarly, courts should acknowledge the
fact-finding nature of summary judgment instead of making claims that appear
to satisfy constitutional concerns. 194 Yet, at the same time, the courts must
remain cognizant of the precious, constitutional rights involved.
188 See FED. R. Civ. P. 1; supra note 2.
189See generally Issacharoff & Lowenstein, supra note 101; see also Carrington, supra
note 124, at 2090-91.
190See Issacharoff & Lowenstein, supra note 101, at 100-03.
191 See generally Lapham, supra note 125.
192THoMAs A. MAUET, PRETRIAL 278 (2d ed. 1993).
193Although today's plaintiffs use motions for summary judgment far less than do
defendants, the original English principles that protected plaintiffs from defendants
who caused unnecessary delays by filing sham answers are still applicable and viable.
See Society Bank, N.A. v. Kellar, 579 N.E.2d 717, 719 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
194 Summary judgment decisions are particularly dubious when they involve
questions of mixed law and fact, i.e. proximate cause. When deciding these issues, also
described as questions of ultimate facts, a judge must describe his rationale as though
he were able to separate the facts from the law. Yet the decision requires that the judge
apply the facts to the law in order to determine what issues exist. Judge William W.
Schwarzer, a member of the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, has written illuminating articles on this subject. See William W. Schwarzer
et al., The Analysis and Decision of Summary Judgment Motions, 139 F.R.D. 441, 455-73
(1992); William W. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment: A Proposed Revision to Rule 56, 110
F.R.D. 213, 225-29 (1986); Schwarzer, supra note 4.
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These last two concerns are dichotomous, but the courts can adequately
address the concerns in a manner that provides at least a traditional level of
predictability.195 The key to such a solution is to articulate the two levels of the
decision making process that are involved in summary judgrnent. Ajudge must
decide whether the evidence is sufficient to satisfy the burdens established by
the applicable substantive law.196 This process requires a judge to decide 1)
whether the evidence is sufficient to persuade a reasonable jury to find in favor
of the non-movant;197 and 2) whether the evidence is sufficient to persuade the
judge that the first consideration will be satisfied.198
The two steps require different levels of persuasion. In civil litigation, the
highest standard of proof required of a plaintiff is the "clear and convincing'
standard. More commonly, however, the plaintiff must adduce evidence
sufficient to persuade a jury by a preponderance of the evidence. Whatever the
substantive law requires, the standard of proof for the first step is so
determined.
In criminal cases, the state, as plaintiff, must typically prove its case beyond
a reasonable doubt Standards of proof vary based upon the liberty or right that
is at stake: the greater the right, the higher the standard of proof. Accordingly,
judges should be confident beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence before
them is insufficient to entitle the non-movant to a full trial.199 If this standard,
in practice, raises the first standard, it is a reasonable radiation of the court's
efforts to protect the litigant's right to a trial.
The two-tiered system allows courts to unleash the shackles that the
Anderson Court attached.200 Once the court announces the two steps in the
195Cynics may identify the term "predictable judicial decision" as an oxymoron.
Nevertheless, practitioners at least should be able to distinguish the arbitrary from the
principled decision, and therein lies traditional predictability-at least as long as
traditional principles are applied.
196 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 253-55 (1986); Perez v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, Co., 520 N.E.2d 198,202 (Ohio 1988).
197 OHIo R. CIV. P. 56(C), supra note 83.
198 See Cohen v. Eleven West 42nd Street, Inc., 115 F.2d 531, 532 (2d Cir. 1940) ("No
doubt, a judge must often come near to trying the issues before he can decide whether
there are any issues to try, but that is inherent in the whole practice [of deciding
summary judgment motions].").
199 The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial is among our most precious rights.
Of course, other equally important rights exist, but none is a more important safeguard
of our democratic system of justice.
20 0The clear language of Anderson can create difficult restraints on a judge who must
rationalize the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact. Some commentators,
however, believe that Anderson circumvents the need to distinguish factual from legal
questions. See WARREN FREEDMAN, SUMMARYJUDGMENTAND OTHER PRECLUSIVE DEVICES
3 (1989); Comment, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term: Leading Case, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100,
256 (1987). Contrary to these views, the Court neither expressly nor implicitly denied
the courts' need to establish a distinction between legal and factual issues. Moreover, in
order to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact when the issue is
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process, it can then freely identify a circumstance that would require the judge
to evaluate the credibility of evidence in order to determine its sufficiency.
Credibility is ultimately a question of how sure the fact-finder is of the fact
presented. Assuming that the fact-finder is certain of the validity of the fact,
she may then decide whether the fact is sufficient.
A. Use of Summary Jury Trials
At least one federal district court judge20 has expounded the virtues of
summary jury trials for his court. An in-depth examination of summary jury
trials is beyond the scope of this Note, but a brief description of the process
may be informative.
A summary jury trial is conducted before six persons drawn at random
from the Court's jury pool, normally used for petit juries, who are
summoned under threat of fine or imprisonment. ... The proceeding
consists of opening and dosing arguments with an overview of
expected trial evidence. No direct testimony is taken from witnesses.
The summary jury's 'verdict' is non-binding.202
Use of a summary jury trial would provide an equitable compromise when
a credibility issue is hopelessly intertwined with a sufficiency issue.203 When
a judge identifies such an issue, his first step would be to presume the evidence
to be sufficiently credible and determine on that basis whether summary
judgment would be proper. If summary judgment would be proper, then the
next step would be to submit the specific evidence to a summary jury trial to
evaluate its credibility.204
one of ultimate fact, the judge must distinguish between the two in order to grant
summary judgment. Without distinguishing the issues, a genuine issue would always
exist in such cases because the legal question could not be resolved without making a
factual determination which then, by definition, would raise a genuine issue of material
fact.
201Thomas D. Lambros, United States District Judge in the Northern District of Ohio,
created the summary jury trial and uses it with success in his court. Thomas D. Lambros,
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A New Adversarial Model for a New Era, 50 U. Pirr. L.
REv. 789 (1989). But see Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53U. CHI. L. REv. 366 (1986).
202 Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506,507-08 (N.D. Ohio 1990). For a more
detailed explanation see Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other
Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461,470-71,482-86 (1984).
20 3 Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (c)(5) (authorizing the court to "take appropriate action with
respect to ... the appropriateness... of summary adjudication under Rule 56"); FED. R.
CIV. P. 43(e) (authorizing the court to hear oral testimony to develop facts not appearing
on record); FED. R. Civ. P. 53 (authorizing the court appointment of a special master to
assist with difficult issues before the court).
20 4The issue concerning whether a judge may compel parties to submit to a summary
jury trial has been a point of contention. Both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, however,
have found that such compulsion is impermissible. See In re: NLO, 5 F.3d 154, 157 (6th
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When the summary jury considers the evidence to determine its credibility,
the jury must, of course, consider whether the evidence is sufficient. Only upon
consideration of both elements can the jury render its verdict in favor of or
against summary judgment. The difference in this process from the judge's
making the decision is two-fold. First, the jury cannot err as a matter of law in
its determination of the sufficiency of the evidence because the judge has
already determined that the evidence is sufficient if credible. If the jury decides
that the summary judgment is not appropriate, it does so because the evidence
is not sufficient when viewed in light of its credibility. Second, even if the jury
apparently nullifies a cause of action, the rights of the parties have been
protected by having a jury make the fact determination rather than a judge.205
A fundamental aspect of the current summary jury trial process is its
advisory nature.206 However, for the purposes of deciding the questionable
existence of an issue of material fact in a summary judgment motion, the jury's
verdict should be binding. Unlike current summary jury trials which are used
strictly as a "settlement tool,"207 in this application, the summary jury trial
serves to resolve an issue of fact. In the event that the jury determines that the
issue is not genuine,208 then its decision should be binding.
This process, beginning with the judge's decision to involve a summary jury
and ending with the summary jury's verdict, limits the jury's function to fact
finding. Thus, in the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving
party has no claim to trial that might allegedly be violated.209 On this basis, the
binding effect of the summary jury verdict should be consistent with Seventh
Cir. 1993); Strandell v. Jackson County, Ill., 838 F.2d 884,886-88 (7th Cir. 1988); see also
S. 2027, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1990) (a failed bill that would have authorized federal
courts to compel participation in summary jury trials). But see McKay v. Ashland Oil,
Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43,46-48 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (holding that a local rule was valid and intended
to give judges in that district authority to compel summary jury trial participation).
Regardless of which is the better view, the dispositive use of summary jury trials with
respect to summary judgment is sufficiently distinct from its current capacity as merely
a settlement tool that compelled participation may be entirely proper despite the current
circuit court opinions to the contrary.
205 When used to determine a factual issue relevant to the summary judgment
determination, the summary jury trial decision would be binding. This is a change from
current summary jury trial practices. Whether a judge could require the litigants to
participate in such binding adjudication is beyond the scope of this note. Of course the
predicate for this proposal is that the judge does have this authority.
206 See supra text accompanying note 202.
207 See Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506, 508 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
208
"[I]f the evidence is merely colorable,... or is not significantly probative... [,]" then
no genuine issue of fact exists. Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc., 585 N.E.2d 384,394 (Ohio 1992)
(Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (omissions in the original)).
209Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-20 (1902).
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Amendment principle that is at risk in summary disposition of cases, that
being the right to trial by jury.210
Using a summary jury trial, however, might be contrary to summary
judgment's intended purpose of expediting resolution of controversies. 211 Still,
if the result of using summary jury trials is the warranted, increased protection
of litigants' rights to trial, the added delay is a small price for the greater
protection of individual rights that is achieved by placing inherently
unpredictable decisions into the jury's deliberation, rather than a judge's
determination. Moreover, other methods can be implemented to offset delays
created by summary jury trials.
B. Entering Summary Judgment Sua Sponte
A summary jury would be used when a decision is inherently
unpredictable. 212 In cases where a summary judgment determination is highly
predictable,213 the motion itself could be preempted by incorporating a
mandatory summary judgment standard. When the trial court recognizes that
no issues of fact are before it, the court should notify the parties of the
determination. After giving the parties adequate time to resolve their dispute
privately, the court should sua sponte enter summary judgment for the
appropriate party.
Like the use of a summary jury trial, sua sponte summary judgments are
already in use in the federal courts.214 The Ohio Supreme Court, however, has
repudiated the power in its state courts. In Marshall v. Aaron,215 the court seized
upon the statutory language indicating that summary judgment shall not be
rendered "unless it appears from ... [the] evidence or stipulation and only therefrom,
that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is
adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made.
..."216 Using this language, and without additional precedent, the court made
a restrictive interpretation of Rule 56(C) requiring that summary judgment
2 10 See supra note 2.
211Posner, supra note 201.
212Two of the most common instances of such decisions are those involving affidavits
of experts' opinions and those involving issues of ultimate facts. See discussion supra
text accompanying notes 137-63.
213 See sources cited infra note 214.
214 E.g., Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 649 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1981)
(citing Kistner v. Califano, 579 F.2d 1004,1006 (6th Cir. 1978) and Capital Films Corp.
v. Charles Fries Prods., 628 F.2d 387,390-91); see also WRIGHT ETAL., supra note 9, § 2719;
E. H. Schopler, Annotation, Court's Power, on Motion for Summary Judgment, to Enter
Judgment Against Movant, 48 A.L.R.2d 1188 (1956). But cf. Powell v. United States, 849
F.2d 1576,1582 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding thata districtcourt improperly granted summary
judgment sua sponte when it did so without giving proper notice to the parties).
215472 N.E.2d 335 (Ohio 1984).
2161d. at 338 (quoting OHIO R. CIv. P. 56(C) (emphasis and omissions in the original)).
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could only be entered pursuant to a motion by a party. This holding is contrary
to the salutary purposes of the rule to the extent that it limits the court's ability
to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is
a genuine need for trial."217
The liberal application of a sua sponte summary judgment in light of
mandatory standards to establish genuine issues is a close cousin to more
restrictive pleading requirements.218 The approaches are similar because both
would encourage more specific pleading and would make it more difficult toprevail when pleadings are sloppily drafted. In addition, both would likely
curb the number of complaints filed.
Unlike creating more strict pleading requirements, mandatory summaryjudgment guidelines would be consistent with the original intent of the framers
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.
Charles Clark was a strong proponent of notice pleading, 219 and his influenceprevailed in this area of federal civil procedure.220 The intent of notice pleading
is to liberalize the rules to the extent that controversies are resolved on their
facts rather than the technical skills of lawyers.221 Any attempt to initiate more
stringent pleading requirements in an effort to curb litigation would conflict
with this principle. In contrast, as discussed supra, Clark envisioned a liberal
application of summary judgment.222 Extending the application of summaryjudgment through the use of sua sponte entry would be consistent with this
vision. More importantly, it is unlikely that suits would be lost on technicalities
as is feared would be the case with more strict pleading requirements. Lawyers
would have to be sufficiently skilled in order to assure that a litigant's claim
raised a genuine issue of material fact, but this is a skill already required. The
only difference in this proposal is that the evidence submitted by counsel will
be subject to the judge's independent review.
In addition, the practical effect is likely to be that rather than courts entering
summary judgments sua sponte, the mere threat would further discourage sham
claims. The threat would be more effective than the current system because the
expectation that a judge will summarily dispose of a claim includes the
217FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee notes. But cf. Pond v. Carey Corp., 517 N.E.2d
928, 931 (Ohio 1986) ("A motion for summary judgment... does not test the legal
sufficiency of the pleadings, but is a factual inquiry.").
218Cf. Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 484-91 (1986) (suggesting a more flexible use of
summary judgment as a means of curbing litigation rather than adopting more stringent
pleading standards).
219 See generally, Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid ofJustice, 23 WASH. U. L. Q. 297,312-20
(1938).
22OSmith, supra note 27, at 915-17.
221Conley v. Gibson, 355 US. 41, 48 (1957).
22 2But cf. Clark, supra note 219, at 318-19 (stating that summary judgment is "adapted
only for rather simple issues" and "is very far from universal in its applicability").
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awareness that the litigation costs which the opposing party will incur will be
even lower when that party can prevail prior to trial without making its own
motions. The ability to summarily dispose of a case in this manner would also
provide the court with another means of enforcing case management which
should always result in reduced costs.223
C. Acknowledging Summary Judgment as a Hybrid Law
Because summary judgment is a defensive weapon rather than just a means
of maintaining order in the adjudication process, courts and litigants alike
would be well served if judges made the fact-finding aspect of the summary
judgment decision patently tied to the substantive law. In other words,
summary judgment doctrine should clearly articulate that the judge's role as a
preliminary fact-finder is tailored to the cause of action before him.224 The
failure to acknowledge the judge's fact-finding function at this stage leaves the
courts susceptible to criticism.
Summary judgment decisions which are apparently inconsistent buttress the
criticism that judges reach those decisions on an ad hoc basis.225 In discussing
the development and use of local rules, Professor Stephen Subrin observed that
the "general, flexible Federal Rules" allowed flexible case-by-case management,
but because "[n]either judges nor lawyers wanted every decision to be ad
hocL,]" absolute standards, with exceptions for good cause, were created. 226
He then concluded that non-trans-substantive rules might avoid the inevitable
prejudice of different cases that would result from the use of absolute
standards. 2 7 Because courts must apply absolute summary judgment
standards to different cases, they avoid prejudice and injustice by creating a
body of law which can appear inconsistent.
For example, in Smiddy v. Wedding Party, Inc.,228 the defendant's van stalled
on an interstate highway. After the engine stalled, the defendant coasted the
van to a stop in the second of four lanes. He asked a truck driver to push the
van off the road, but the truck-driver declined. The defendant then sat in his
van thinking of what to do next. Within approximately one minute, another
vehicle, driven by the appellant/plaintiff's decedent, struck the rear of the van
223 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee notes.
224 Cf. Carrington, supra note 124, at 2083 ("As courts struggle... to give effective
enforcement of substantive rights, procedural rules sometimes taken on subtly different
contextual meanings."); Marcy J. Levine, supra note 53, at 214 (cautioning that the
language from each of the Celotex trilogy cases be used in the context of their respective
cause of action).
225 See Amstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 479-80 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting).
226 Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence,
and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2043 (1989).
2271d.
228506 N.E.2d 212 (Ohio 1987).
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resulting in a fatal accident.229 The court held that an issue of fact existed as to
whether it was impossible for the defendant to comply with a statute230 which
required the driver to place warning markers one hundred feet in front of and
behind the van.231
When compared with Smiddy, Lewis v. Bland232 is a troubling case. In Lewis,
a police officer in his cruiser saw a speeding vehicle "swerve to avoid a truck
and go left of center while navigating a turn.".33 The officer made a U-turn and
began what escalated into a high speed pursuit. Subsequently, the officer ran
a stop sign during the chase and struck a third vehicle injuring its driver, Brian
Lewis.234 The officer made a sworn statement that he was responding to an
"emergency call".235 Without any additional analysis, the court observed that
an "emergency call situation" could be identified as a matter of law, and this
situation did not raise any issue of material fact that would preclude summary
judgment. 236
The facts of these two cases are sufficiently distinguishable as to not pose a
problem when viewing the efficacy of summary judgment on a case by case
basis. The problem arises, however, because, in theory, the court should
consistently apply the law to all cases. Courts or commentators may justify
these two decisions by pointing out that, in the former case, the justices simply
applied the standard more stringently than did the judges of the latter case.
While such analysis is accurate, it glosses over the factual differences that lead
to varying degrees of the same standard's application.
The cynical acid might be quite diluted and yet still reveal the equities at
play here. In the former case, summary judgment would have been predicated
on the conduct of a commercial van driver that would have precluded the
decedent's estate from any recovery for his untimely demise. In the latter case,
summary judgment was predicated, in part, on a police officer's sworn
statement that lead to the exoneration of a city from liability. Thus, the differing
degrees of applying the same standard of review may be the flesh, but it is the
facts and the underlying equities that are the soul of these decisions.
22 91d. at 214.
230 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4513.28(D) (Anderson 1991).
231506 N.E.2d at 215-16.
232599 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
233 Id. at 815.
234/d.
235 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.02(B)(1)(a) (Anderson 1991) (providing that police
officers responding to an emergency are not subject to a negligence standard). Thus the
issue before the court was whether the facts at bar satisfied the definition of anIemergency call," as a matter of law, pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.01(A)
(Anderson 1991).
236599 N.E.2d at 816.
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In cases involving different causes of action or very distinct underlying
equities, the reflection of summary judgment doctrine between cases becomes
somewhat distorted. When summary judgment doctrine is limited to similar
causes of action, however, the doctrine's reflection is more likely to remain true.
If litigants could expect a particular level of scrutiny based on their cause of
action, there would be sufficient consistency to diffuse this "ad hoc" criticism
This is not to suggest that new procedural standards be developed for every
cause of action. To the contrary, these cases demonstrate that differing
standards already exist 237 Courts only need to articulate those differences
rather than allowing them to silently influence their decisions. Such
articulation would help develop a coherent body of law that places summary
judgment in a substantive context. In turn, judges and litigants would benefit
from dependable, consistent guidelines. In addition, if judges expressly
acknowledge that their standard is defined within the context and doctrine of
the substantive law at bar, the doctrine would foster the perception of judicial
integrity by undermining any allegations of arbitrary jurisprudence.
At its abstract level, the concept of defining a rule of procedure based on the
substantive law at issue may be disconcerting. Yet, the proposal's unusual
aspect is not this concept. Indeed,judges currently seem to adapt their standard
of review in light of the substantive issues.238 If anything is unusual about the
proposal, it is the suggestion that the myth of summary judgment as a pure
rule of procedure should be acknowledged as just that: a myth. As cognoscenti
of the Erie doctrine239 are well aware, the line between substantive law and
procedure can be very undear. Summary judgment, however, encompasses
both. In summary judgment decisions, the procedure cannot be separated from
the substance. The attempts to do so have resulted only in confusion at best
and ad hoc jurisprudence at worst.
V. CONCLUSION
Currently, trial court judges struggle with an impractical standard to use in
applying a unique, beneficial tool for providing justice. Together, our courts
and legislators must create practical standards that provide a manageable
system of review in determinations concerning the existence of genuine issues
237 See also Levine, supra note 53, at 184 (Antitrust conspiracy and public figure
defamation cases are "areas involv[ing] questions of 'state of mind' and have
traditionally recieved special treatment under the summary judgment rule").
2 38See Carrington, supra note 124, at 2083; cf. United States v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S,
590 F.2d 196,199 (6th Cir. 1978) ("Summary judgment procedures under Rule 56, FED.
R. CIv. P., must necessarily be construed in the light of the statutory law of forfeitures.
23 9See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc.,
356 U.S. 525,536-39 (1958); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99,108 (1945); Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73-75 (1938); see also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL.,
PRocEDuRE § 4.3 (1985).
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of material fact. The standards must permit judges to render consistent
opinions and promote the policies that summary judgment continues to serve.
This Note offers three proposals to improve summary judgment
adjudication. First, the court should adopt the use of summary jury trials to
resolve inherently difficult summary judgment determinations. Although a
summary jury may be an expensive and time consuming process, it would
insure that the fact-finder properly determined that no genuine issue of
material fact exists. In addition, this procedure is far less time consuming and
expensive than actual litigation of the claim. The primary benefit of this system
is when issues of credibility are involved the jury may weigh that credibility in
making its determination. Furthermore, because the judge predetermines the
issue of law prior to submitting the factual issue to the jury, there is no danger
of the facts distorting the law at this stage of adjudication.
Second, the Ohio legislature should permit courts to enter summary
judgment sua sponte when appropriate. Armed with the power to enter
summary judgment sua sponte, courts could dispose of cases more quickly and
offset delays created by the use of summary jury trials. In addition, the mere
existence of the power would increase deterrence of frivolous claims and
defenses.
Third, judges should treat summary judgment doctrine as a hybrid of
substantive and procedural law. Initially this might raise concerns that there
will be as many different standards for summary judgment as there are
substantive laws. Yet, this is precisely the benefit of acknowledging the hybrid
nature of the rule. Courts already render opinions based on various standards
defined by the substantive context of the case. The failure to articulate these
variations threatens the perception of judicial integrity. Once the summary
judgment standards are explicitly tied to a substantive context, judges and
litigants alike will benefit from more reliable, consistent guidelines.
By acknowledging the countervailing interests at play in the summary
judgment determination and allowing judges to freely exercise preliminary,
fact-finding discretion within articulable boundaries, new doctrine can
improve upon that which already exists. The result should be to increase
confidence in the judicial process through raising the level of assurance of
equitable, efficient resolutions of disputes.
GREGORY A. GORDILLO
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